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Conclusions 
8.1 Answering the Research Questions 
In the previous decades, there has been a considerable amount of research examining the 
effects of personal contacts on labor market outcomes. This research provided important 
insights about the conditions under which social networks contribute to inequalities. Yet, the 
question why personal connections contribute to inequalities was neglected. The use of 
personal contacts can be evaluated in both negative and positive terms. On the one hand, 
personal contacts can be considered as an irrational phenomenon. The existence of friendship 
ties creates incentives to hire a friend instead of even better but personally not known other 
applicants (particularism). On the other hand, the use of contacts is a necessary consequence 
of an important information problem in labor markets: employers are uncertain about the 
abilities and the prospective behavior of applicants and these uncertainties are reduced by 
informal recruitment (intensive search). 
The recent history of post-communist countries shows the importance of understanding the 
causes of network effects. The state-socialist political and economic system created a society 
where arranging things through personal contacts was necessary to promote individual well-
being. Although the transition to capitalism eliminated the particular political and economic 
system that induced networking, inherited contacts and the culture of networking might be 
useful to cope with a problem induced by the transition itself: the decrease in living conditions. 
Additionally, due to changes in educational and labor market institutions, firms find themselves 
in a more uncertain labor market. Not surprisingly, based on the ideas of path-dependence, the 
general hypothesis was put forward that network resources are extremely useful in post-
communist societies (Sik 1994).  
This book made an attempt to assess this hypothesis empirically. The research was 
restricted to the Hungarian labor market. In order to assess the importance of personal 
contacts, two questions were posed. The first question is whether network resources are 
helpful to find job opportunities through personal contacts. The second question is whether 
better jobs can be obtained through personal contacts than through other channels. In order to 
understand the causes of path-dependent features, a third question was posed, namely whether 
observed contact effects are due to particularism or to intensive search. 
Our research questions were examined using data about young job seekers who left 
vocational secondary schools in 1998. The data are from a survey with two measurement 
points. Data about network resources, job finding methods, and several labor market outcomes 




were collected in the period starting with December 1998 and ending with February 1999. In 
October 1999, respondents were approached to increase the sample of employees, on the one 
hand, and collect information about job tenure, on the other hand. The basic advantage of this 
data set is that it allows the interpretation of statistical relationships in terms of network and 
contact effects. The research design is limited to the extent that it does not include a survey of 
firms, which would increase the quality of firm and job level information. 
Our first research question was whether network resources increase the chances of finding 
a job through either a high status contact or through an employee referral. This question was 
examined in Chapter 5. We found two processes that work in opposite directions. On the one 
hand, high status family members decrease the probability of finding a job through personal 
contacts. On the other hand, among those who found a job through contacts, high status family 
members are helpful to find a job through high status contacts. These opposite effects imply 
that network resources do not have an influence on the chances of finding a job through high 
status persons or employee referrals. 
Our second research question was whether high status contacts or employee referrals help 
one to find a good job. This question was examined in Chapter 6. Our findings are fully 
consistent with accumulated evidence on contact effects (see Chapter 2). Personal contacts in 
general do not lead to better jobs than formal job finding methods, but they often lead to better 
jobs than direct job finding methods. The effects of personal contacts become apparent when 
we take into account the characteristics of the contact person. Both high status contacts and 
employee referrals are helpful to find jobs in firms and occupations which are likely to provide 
long-term earnings advantages. Additionally, high status contacts inform job seekers about 
opportunities that are associated with better earnings opportunities. Finally, employee referrals 
increase the chances of keeping the job. To summarize, the use of high status contacts and 
employee referrals provides advantages over those who find a job through other channels. In 
other words, our study replicated the theory of employee referrals and social resources theory 
in a new research setting. 
The first and the second research questions are closely linked to a two-step modeling 
strategy, which assumes that social network effects on labor markets are mediated by the 
personal contacts (see Section 1.5). Given the answers to the first two research questions, we 
can also answer the question that motivates research into network effects in labor markets, 
namely whether network resources are an additional determinant of inequalities. Although 
contact characteristics have a substantial impact on the distribution of earnings opportunities, 
the characteristics of the contacts are independent of network resources. As a consequence, 
network resources do not contribute to inequalities.  
The first two research questions were concerned with the description of how network 
resources affect inequalities. Additionally, our research also aimed to explain the observed 
contact effects. This aim was expressed by the third research question, namely whether 
intensive search or particularism generates the observed contact effects. This question was 
examined in Chapter 7 by testing four hypotheses. Similar to the logic of crucial experiments, 




these hypotheses were developed in order to distinguish between intensive search and 
particularism. We found contradictory evidence with respect to the organizational conflict 
hypothesis. Unfortunately, we had no sufficient evidence to evaluate the other three 
hypotheses. Therefore, we remained uncertain about the mechanism that generates employee 
referral effects. In other words, our study cannot answer the question whether the 
particularism or the intensive search mechanism generates the observed contact effects. 
Nevertheless, based on the observation that personnel departments do not increase the chances 
of careful screening, our conjecture is that the particularism mechanism might operate in the 
Hungarian labor market. 
 
 
8.2 The Merits and Limitations of the Study 
This book makes two important contributions to the study of the relationship between personal 
contacts and labor market outcomes. Both contributions are related to the data and methods 
we used. First, our study of contact effects, reported in Chapter 6, substantially improves on 
earlier analyses of the relationship between personal contacts and earnings (or statuses). 
Contrary to a typical getting–a–job study using a sample of employees, our study using a 
sample of job searchers allowed the decomposition of the cross–sectional relationship between 
contacts and earnings into three parts. The decomposition corresponds to three explanations 
why employees who found their job informally might earn more than others do. The first is that 
job seekers using personal contacts become aware of above–average earnings opportunities. 
The second is that contacts increase the chances of getting a job. The third is that people who 
got their job informally are promoted earlier, thereby their salary grows faster. We found 
empirical support for the first account. In the light of existing studies, this is not surprising: it is 
known that personal contacts have a negative impact on the growth in salaries (Corcoran et al. 
1980, Simon and Warner 1992) and neither employers nor job seekers are willing to reject 
applicants and jobs (Devine and Kiefer 1991). 
Second, our presentation of evidence in terms of marginal effects allows researchers to 
compare contact effects to the effects of human capital characteristics. Employee referrals and 
high status contacts seem to be more important than education in accessing good jobs. For 
example, referrals and high status contacts are more likely to lead to jobs with foreign property 
or to large firms (the advantage ranges from 10 up to 16 percent; see Table 6.6). To take 
another example, the rate of returns to high status contacts in terms of starting salaries is 
approximately twice as much as the returns to education (consult Table 6.8). Note that one 
unit change in our education variable reflects one or two years of additional schooling because 
apprentice education last three years while vocational secondary and technical education last 4-
5 years. Thus, contacting of a high status person is as important as having 2-4 years of 
additional vocational education! 




Our finding of relatively large returns to personal contacts underscores several concerns 
with respect to he institutions of the Hungarian labor market. Students of the Hungarian labor 
market argued that, due to changes in the system of education and training, educational 
credentials are less trusted than before (see Section 1.4). Mistrust in educational credentials is 
one of the possible causes of finding contact effects in labor markets. Additionally, investments 
in institutions constraining particularistic practices are likely to be small in transforming 
societies.  
Although our research documents the importance of personal contacts in getting a good 
job, we do not know the causes of these effects. As a consequence, we do not know whether 
large returns to personal contacts are due to the mistrust in educational credentials or to the 
absence of legal rules that would constrain particularism. Thus, we cannot single out exactly 
which labor market and educational institutions are responsible for the observed contact 
effects.  
Our failure at this point is related to the research design we used. Recently, it was argued 
that the test of theoretical hypotheses that aim to distinguish mechanisms requires data about 
the demand side of the labor market (Marsden and Gorman [forthcoming], Fernandez et al. 
2000). Unfortunately, it is very demanding to supplement data about job searchers with data 
from a survey among firms. The collection of data about job searchers had clear priorities: 
description is logically prior to explanation and the description of network effects requires data 
about job searchers. Since both intensive search and particularism have implications that can be 
examined using data about job seekers and employees, the idea of a survey among employers 
was rejected. The price to be paid is that no information is available to test our conjecture that 
personnel departments do not constrain particularism. 
We were also able to give a detailed description of how the acquisition of job information 
through high status contacts or referrals depends on social networks. The finding that network 
resources facilitate the contacting of high status people supports social resources theory. The 
finding that having unemployed or inactive people in the family discourages people from 
informal search is consistent with several empirical studies carried out in other settings. 
However, we found an unexpected negative effect of family resources on the chances of 
finding a job informally. Further, we did not find evidence for the effect of other network 
resources variables. These negative findings raise the question whether it was appropriate to 
measure the family network resources variables with dummies. Additionally, the measurement 
of the network resources outside the family variable is not reliable due to the retrospective 
name generator items. The use of retrospective network items is the dark side of our research 
design aiming to maximize the number of respondents who found a job opportunity. Thus, the 
problems associated with the description of network resources effects are other prices to be 
paid for the successful description of contact effects. 
 
 




8.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
Our research made an attempt to answer the questions how networks contribute to inequalities 
and what are the mechanisms and institutions that generate these network effects. Thus, our 
study can be seen as a contribution to the social capital research program (Flap 1999). Our 
empirical findings have three important implications for researchers who wish to contribute to 
this research program. 
Our empirical analyses were guided by the assumption that network resources have no 
direct causal effect on labor market outcomes (two-step modeling strategy). This assumption 
turned out to be fruitful since we were able to understand why network resources do not affect 
the distribution of earnings in Hungary. As the idea of social capital gains popularity among 
social scientists, there is a tendency to describe the total effect of social networks on labor 
market outcomes and to explain the empirical findings using the assumption that networks are 
capital that bring returns. This tendency is often due to the absence of information about 
intermediate outcomes. Nevertheless, this procedure is flawed because networks should not be 
described as capital when it is not shown which processes generate these returns (Baron and 
Hannan 1994). The two-step modeling strategy opens the black box of network effects and 
shows how networks bring returns. Therefore, the research program of social capital should 
rely on the two-step modeling strategy; otherwise, social capital remains a metaphor. 
The second implication is that future research should combine economic and sociological 
theories. We used insights from both search theory and structural theories to understand the 
relationship between network resources and the characteristics of the person who passed the 
job information. We tested both an economic and a sociological theory when we described the 
effects of personal contacts on labor market outcomes. In the light of our empirical findings, 
reliance on both economic and sociological ideas at the same time was necessary. Otherwise, 
we would not be able to give a complete picture about the conditions under which personal 
contacts lead to better jobs and to explain why network resources do not affect inequalities. 
Our study demonstrates that a complete description of network effects needs both economics 
and sociology, in general, and search theory, the theory of employee referrals, and social 
resources theory, in particular. Yet, students of network effects rarely use search theoretic 
ideas and the theory of employee referrals in empirical work. Search theoretical ideas are often 
mentioned, but only in theoretical discussions. Furthermore, despite some overviews and 
applications (Marsden and Gorman [forthcoming], Fernandez et al. 2000), sociologists seem to 
be largely ignorant about the theory of employee referrals.61 However, sociologists cannot 
                                               
61
 The ignorance of sociologists about the theory of employee referrals and the negative evaluation of search 
theory is probably due to the influence of Granovetter (1974). In Section 2.4, we mentioned that the strength 
of weak ties hypothesis stems from Granovetter’s criticism of search theory. Ignorance about the theory of 
employee referrals is associated with the originality of Granovetter’s work. Granovetter’s own research 
question, i.e. how people became aware of job opportunities, and his answer to this question, the famous 
strength of weak ties hypothesis, were not explicitly related to the theory of employee referrals and they were 
original contributions. The reception of Granovetter’s work was guided by focusing on the originality of his 




ignore the theory of employee referrals. I argued that it plays an important role in the strength 
of weak ties hypothesis (see Section 2.4). Additionally, students of social resources theory 
might pose research questions which they think as new problems, but which are indeed old and 
elaborated within the theory of employee referrals (Lin 1999: 484). Our research can be 
viewed as an appeal to sociologists that, next to the use of social resources theory, they should 
rely on the theory of employee referrals, but not on the strength of weak ties hypothesis.  
Finally, more attention should be paid to the development of explanatory hypotheses. The 
failure to identify the mechanism behind contact effects might be associated with the current 
(under)development of theoretical ideas. Although substantial empirical evidence was 
accumulated about the importance of personal contacts in getting a good job, less effort was 
made to develop hypotheses that can distinguish between different intensive search and 
particularism mechanisms. Additionally, a recent attempt to distinguish between competing 
explanations (Fernandez et al. 2000) considers only the elements of the theory of employee 
referrals, but it does not analyze social resources theory. As a consequence, there are no 
discussions, let alone a consensus, about the implications of various mechanisms our research 
could have relied on. Future research should take particularism seriously and conduct case 
studies in order to disentangle the implications of intensive search and particularism (cf. 
Fernandez et al. 2000).62 The most nagging question such case studies should answer is what 
do personnel departments do in Hungarian firms, in general, and what is the role of personnel 
departments in the setting of wages and recruitment, in particular. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
question and theory. However, Getting a Job is not a work with a single theoretical perspective: there are 
several pages documenting that Granovetter was aware of and influenced by the work of Rees. 
62
 So far only one strategy was proposed in the literature to differentiate between particularism and intensive 
search: the distinction between help (“putting in a good word”) and providing information. However, the 
insider-outsider version of particularism seems to contradict this distinction: employees have control over 
hiring decisions, and they pass job information to their friends and relatives without giving additional help. 
